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Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 /026 W
----------311550Z 098014 /41
O 311135Z MAR 77
FM USDEL SECRETARY AIRCRAFT
TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 SECTO 03069

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS R.)
SUBJECT: TEXT OF SECRETARY'S STATEMENT TO THE NAC

1. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF SECRETARY'S STATEMENT TO THE NAC AS REFERRED TO IN USNATO 1742. YOU SHOULD REPEAT THIS TO THE SAME ADDRESSEES AS YOUR REPORT ON THE SESSION. AND MISSION MAY DISTRIBUTE ON COSMIC TOP SECRET BASIS TO OTHER ALLIED MISSIONS.

BEGIN TEXT:

--I AM VERY HAPPY TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU BEFORE UNDERTAKING MY TRIP TO MOSCOW. I WANT TO REAFFIRM AT THE OUTSET THE MESSAGE CONVEYED TO YOU BY VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE THT OUR ADMINISTRATION WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU. IN MAY, THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WILL BE COMING TO EUROPE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LONDON MINISTERIAL MEETING.
--THE PRESIDENT IS DEDICATED TO THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ALLIANCE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE. IT IS A FIRM BASE FROM WHICH TO PURSUE OUR COMMON GOAL OF PEACE AND SECURITY.
--THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, AS YOU KNOW, IS DEEPLY
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COMMITTED TO FURTHERING THE DEMOCRATIC IDEALS WHICH HAVE ALWAYS INSPIRED THIS ALLIANCE.
-- THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMINISTRATION CAME TO OFFICE RECOGNIZING THAT WESTERN UNGLXCIS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE PURSUIT OF AN EASING OF TENSIONS--BOTH IN GLOBAL TROUBLE SPOTS AND WITH THE EAST. ACCORDINGLY, WE VIEW CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AS AN INTEGRAL

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PART OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS,
VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE HAS MET WITH THE COUNCEL;
ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON HAS DISCUSSED MY MIDDLE
EAST TRIP WITH YOU; A REPORTON AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S
AFRICAN MISSION WAS MADE AVAILABLE; DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY ARMITAGE CONSULTED ON EASTERN EUROPE;
AND, EARLIER THIS WEEK, LES GELZG, THE DIRECTOR OF OUR
BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS CAME TO CONSULT
ON SALT. AFTER THE MOSCOW TALKS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
ARTHUR HARTMAN AND LES GELB WILL BE RETURNING TO
BRIEF YOU ON THEM.
--OUR EXPECTATIONS FOR THE MOSCOW VISIT ARE AT
REALISTIC LEVELS. WE HOPE FOR PROGRESS, BUT RECOGNIZE
THAT THE ROAD MAY BE DIFFICULT. OUR PURPOSES AT
THIS TIME ARE TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN AGREE UPON A
FRAMEWORK FRO THE NEGOTIATION OF A SALT II AGREEMENT,
TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL
INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL, AND TO
DISCUSS A RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING
THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, AND BERLIN.
-- --KNALT WILL RECEIVE THE PRINCIPAL ATTENTION. AS
I HAVE INDICATED, WE WILL ALSO WANT TO SOUND OUT
SOVIET VIEWS ON A RANGE OF OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.
THESE INCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEXT BAN, NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION, MBFR, INDIAN OCEAN MILITARY LIMITATIONS,
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRAGKSFER RESTRAINTS, AS WELL AS
LIMITATIONS ON ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES,* PRIOR
ANNOUNCEMENT OF MISSILE FLIGHT TESTS, AND POLLIBLE
LIMITATIONS ON CIVEL DEFENSE PROGRAMS.
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AAIN THE INTERNATIONAL AREA, THE SOVIETS HAVE
INDICATED THAT THEY WISH TO DISCUSS CYPRUS AND THE
UPCOMING BELGRADE CONFERENCE AS WELL.
--THERE ARE ALSO SOME US-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES
THAT WE HOPE TO DEAL WITH, INCLUDING FAMILY REUNIFICA-
TION CASES, MARITIME SHIPPING, CIVIL AVIATION PROBLEMS,
AND THE EXTENSION OF SEVERAL OF OUR COOPERATIVE AGREE-
MENTS.
--BEFORE I TURN TO THESE MATTERS IN MORE DETAIL, I
WOULD LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT OUR OVERALL
PERSPECTIVE ON RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.
AAFIRST, WE REGARD EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS ONE ASPECT
OF AN ESSENTIALLY THREE-FOLD FOREIGN POLICY, A POLICY
THAT WORKS FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTHENED TIES
WITH OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS, THE IMPROVEMENT OF GOLBAL
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELLR-BEING, AND HELP IN CALMING
CRISIS AREAS. OUR NYICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION IS
AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THIS THREE-FOLD APPROACH. THUS,
WE SEEK TO RESTRAIN MILITARY COMPETITION BETWEEN EAST

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AND WEST, ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR TOWARDS CRISIS
AREAS, AND ENLIST SOVIET COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL
EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH GOLBAL ISSUES.
--SECOND, WE REGARD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION
AS MULTIFACETED: BOTH COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE
ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. WE HOLD NO ILLUSION THAT WE CAN
ELIMINTE THE COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
OR TRANSFROM THE SOVIET SYSTEM. WE WILL TRY TO EXPAND
COOPERATION WHERE POSSIBLE, BUT WE WILL NOT SHRINK FROM
DIFFERING WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHENLW DEEM IT NECESSARY.
--THIRD, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL WITH EACH FACET
OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP ON ITS OWN MERITS, ALTHOUGH
SOME ISSUES INEVITABLEY OVERLAP. IN THAT WAY WE KAN
PROCEED WITH THE VARIOUS SUBJECTS ON OUR AGENDAS--ARMS
CONTROL, RESTRAINT IN THIRD AREAS, TRADE, HUMAN RIGHTS--
ON AN ISSUE-BY-ISSUE BASIS. THE FACT REMAINS, HOWEVER,
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THAT CONFRONTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD OR OVERT REPRESSION
IN THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT HELP BUT INFLUENCE THE DOMESTIC
POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WE PURSUE DETENTE.
-- I KNOW THAT ALL OF YOU HAVE PARTICULAR INTEREST
IN OUR APPROACH TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE
PRESIDENT IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TOCAFFIRMING THE BASIC
RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF INDIVIDUALS. HE BELIEVES THAT
WE HAVE A COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO GIVE
EXPRESSION TO OUR BASIC VALUES IN OUR CONDUCT OF
FOREIGN POLICY. WE MUST STATE WHAT WEJSTAND FOR AND
WHAT WE BELIEVE. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT HESITATE TO
STATE ITS VIEWS. OUR VALUES MUST SHAPE OUR GOALS, OR
WE WILL BE RUDDERLESS IN OUR LONG TERM APPROACH. SUCH
AN APPROACH WILL BUILD DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR OUR FOREIGN
POLICIES.
--THE US INTENT IS TO WEAVE OUR CONCERN ABOUT HUMAN
RIGHTS INTO OUR ENTIRE FOREIGN POLICY. IT IS AN
AMERICAN INTEREST, MUCH AS WE HAVE ECONOMIC INTERESTS
AND SECURITY INTERESTS. WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE,
THAT THIS EFFORT REQUIRES CAREFULY CONSIDERED APPLICA-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES IN OUR REACTION TO
PRACTICAL SITUATIONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. OUR AIM
IS TO IJQROVE--NOT TO WORSEN--THE PLIGHT OF THE
INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. WE ARE FIRMLY COMMITED TO
PURSUING THIS ISSUE, BUT WILL DO SO WITH CAREFUL
REGARD TO THE FULL RANGE OF OUR INTERESTS IN EACH
SPECIFIC COUNTRY AND REGION AFFECTED.

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EXDIS

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED CLEARLY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO SINGLE OUT THE SOVIET UNION. OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS MUST BE VIEWED TOGETHER WITH OTHER IMPORTANT US AND ALLIED INTERESTS THAT WE PURSUE WITH MOSCOW. MOST IMPORTANT IS THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL. IN SHORT, IT SHOULD PROVE POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS OVER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES DESPITE OUR DISAGREEMENTS ON OTHER ISSUES. WE HAVE NO WISH TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH IT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE TO TREAT WITH A GOVERNMENT WHOSE ACTIONS ARE BEING CRITICIZED.
--TURNING TO SALT, I KNOW THAT LES GELB, EARLIER THIS WEEK, PROVIDED YOU WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNC OF OUR SALT REVIEW AND OUR THINKING ON THE VARIOUS ISSUES INVOLVED.
--I AM TAKING TWO PACKAGES TO MOSCOW. ONE IS A COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE. THE OTHER IS A BASED ON THE AGGREGATE VLADIVOSTOK LEVELS OF 2400 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES AND A 1320 CEILING ON MISSLES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS' BUT DEFERS THE BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSLE ISSUES UNTIL SALT III.
-- LET ME DESCRIBE THE COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE IN SOME D GREATER DETAIL. ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE IS TO ACHIEVE GREATER STRATEGIC STABELITY THROUGH A
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REDUCTION IN THE VULNERABILITY OF FIXED ICBMS. MORE GENERALLY, IT WOULD REPRESENT A GENUINE ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENT IN TERMS OF REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REAL CONSTRAINTS ON QUALITATIVE
IMPROVEMENTS IN DEPLOYED FORCES.
THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THIS APPROACH ARE:
--IT WOULD INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE
NUMBER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES FROM 2400 DOWN
TO ABOUT 2000. REDUCTIONS TO THESE LEVELS WOULD IN
NO WAY DISADVANTAGE THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST IN THE
STRATEGIC MEASURE OF NUCLEAR PARITY OR IN ANY LESS-
THAN -ALL-OUT NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. IT WOULD ENHANCE
STRATEGIC STABILITY.
--A REDUCTION IN THE MIRV CEILINGS FOR BOTH SIDES
FROM 1320 TO ABOUT 1200. THIS REDUCTION WOULD LEAVE US
AN ABUNDANCE OF WARHEADS FOR ALL TARGETING AND BARGAINING
REQUIREMENTS.
--PREFERENTIAL REDUCTIONS IN HEAVY SOVIET ICBMS.
THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD REDUCING THE
DISPARITY IN THE ICBM THROW WEIGHT BETWEEN THE SOVIET
UNION AND THE UNITED STATES.
-- A FREEZE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF EXISTING ICBMS.
THIS WOULD PLACE CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF ICBMS
EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS.
-- A BAN ON MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING ICBMS. THIS
WOULD REINFORCE THE PREVIOUS POINT BY PREVENTING
QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS ON ICBMS ALREADY DEPLOYED.
-- A BAN ON THE TESTING, DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT
OF NEW ICBMS. THIS WOULD UNDERPIN OUR WHOLE EFFORT
TO PREVENT QUALITATIVE UPGRADING OF ICBMS ON EITHER
SIDE.
-- CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE BANNED OVER A CERTAIN
RANGE. THE CEILING ON RANGE WOULD, PF COURSE, BE
CONSISTENT WITH US AND ALLIED INTERESTS IN THIS NEW
WEAPON SYSTEM AND WITH OUR GOLS FOR SALT III.
-- FINALLY, IT WOULD INCLUDE CONSTRAINTS ON THE SOVIET
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BACKFIRE BOMBER TO ENSURE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USED IN
A STRATEGIC ROLE.
-- THIS IS, AS I HAVE SAID, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
TO SALT. THE PRESIDENT AND I WANT TO HAVE A FULL RUN
AT TRYING TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION THAT THIS
APPROACH MAKES MUTUAL SENSE AND THAT IT, INDEED, WOULD
ENHANCE WORLD SECURITY.
-- OUR ALTERNATIVE TO A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH--
IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD REJECT IT IS TO SET ASIDE THE
CRUISE MISSILS AND BACKFIER ISSUES. IN DOING SO,
WE SOULD THEN WANT TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY INTO SALT
III IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THESE AND ALL OTHER REMAINING
ISSUES AND SIGN A NEW TREATY.
-- WHAT WE PLAN TO DO IN MOSCOW IS TO PRESENT THESE
TWO ALTERNATIVES TO THE SOVIET UNION. IFPLAN APPROACH

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APPEARS PROMISING, WE WILL SEEK TO USE IT AS A FRAME-
WORK FOR REOPENING SALT DISCUSSIONS AT GENEVA.
EVEN IF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE ABLE TO AGREE
UPON A SINGLE OVERALL APPROACH IN MOSCOW, NUMEROUS
REMAINING QUESTIONS WILL NEED TO BE DECIDED AFTER THE
MOSCOW TALKS.

-- A RETURN TO GENEVA AND CAREFUL ADDITIONAL WORK AT
THE DELEGATION LEVEL CLEARLY WILL BE REQUIRED,
HOWEVER, BEFORE THE ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT FALL INTO
PLACE. IN THE PROCESS OF REFINING OUR POSITIONS ON
THESE AND OTHER SALT QUESTIONS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO
DISCUSS THE ISSUES WITH YOU.
-- NOW LET ME TURN TO THE QUESTION OF SEEKING AN END
TO NUCLEAR TESTING. AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT CARTER
HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT HE WISHES TO MOVE QUICKLY
TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.
-- THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER PROLLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS REPRESENTS A THREAT TO THE
SECURITY OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, AND THE QUEST FOR A
CESSATION OF TESTING WILL BE A KEY
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ELEMENT OF OUR NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY.
-- WHILE OUR ULTIMATE GOAL IS THE ADHERENCE OF ALL
NUCLEAR POWERS TO SUCH A TREATY, THE PRESIDENT HAS
CALLED UPON THE USSR TO JOIN THE UNITED STATES IN A
CESSATION OF TESTING FOR A PERIOD OF LIMITED DURATION
AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD THAT GOAL. I INTEND TO EXPLOER
THIS WITH THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW. IN THIS
CONNECTION I WOULD POINT OUT THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO ANY
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION EXCEPTION. I ALSO WANT TO
UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.
-- WE ARE UNDERTAKING AN INTENSIVE STUDY OF WHAT
VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WILL BE REQUIRED IN THIS
REGARD.
-- A CTB WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT NATO STRATEGY FOR
DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE AND WILL CONSTRAIN SOVIET FORCE
MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS. OUR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO
SUPPORT OUR COMMITMENTS WILL NOT BE IMPAIRED UNDER A
CTB.
-- WE WILL BE CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH MEMBERS OF THE
ALLIANCE ON THE SUBSTANCE AND PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT.
AT SOME POINT, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS
TO A MULTILATERAL FORUM SUCH AS THE CCD, ONCE OUR
INITIAL DISCUSSIONS ARE SUFFICIENTLY ADVANCEKON IN
BEDER TO GAIN THE WIDEST POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR A CTB.

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EXDIS

-- TURNING NOW TO MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS, WE REGARD PROGRESSIN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS RECENTLY UNDERTAKEN A REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GIVE GREATER POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE TALKS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING APPROXIMATE PARITY OF OUTCOMEN COLLECTIVITY OF OBLIGATIONS, AND AN EMPHASIS ON SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS, REMAIN VALID, AND SHOULD BE PURSUED VIGOROUSLY.
-- IN MOSCOW I INTEND TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO MBFR AND TO URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO COME FORWARD WITH POSITIVE STEPS TO MATCH THOSE MADE BY NATO IN THE OPTION III NUCLEAR OFFER. IT ISOZARTI-CULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION GIVE SOME INDIA CATION OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO MOVE TOWARD THE CONCEPT OF MANPOWER PARITYN INCLUDING AN INDICATION OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO AVVEPT THE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.
-- NO NEW MBFR PROPOSALS WILL BE MADE IN MOSCOW. I BELIEVE THAT OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY MY VISIT SHOULD BE USED TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO OPEN THE WAY FOR
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SEROUS MOVEMENT IN MBFR. IN COMING MONTHS, WE WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU AS TO OUR SENSE OF CURRENT

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SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND ON THE
TACTICS THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD PURSUE TO ACHIEVE ITS
OBJECTIVES. IF WE CAN PERSAUDE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT
OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES, WE WILL WANT TO BE IN A
POSITION OURSELVES TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY. IN THAT WAY,
WE CAN EMPHASIZE OUR SERIOUSNESS OF INTENT TO CARRY
NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH TO AN AGREEMENT.
-- NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION WILL ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT
TOPIC. WE WILL USE THE MOSCOW TALKS TO STRESS, AS WE
HAVE IN OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH WESTERN SUPPLIERS, THE
GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER ATTACHES TO THIS
SUBJECT. WE WILL PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH AN OVERVIEW
OF OUR CURRENT NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY REVIEW, INCLUDING
SUCH ISSUES AS REPROCESSING, FUEL SUPPLY ASSURANCES
AND FULL FUEL CYCLE SAFEGUARDS. WE WILL EMPHASIZE TO
THE SOVIETS THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT WEAKENING THE SAFE-
GUARD REGIME ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH NPT AND
SUPPLIER'S GROUP GUIDELINED, AND OUR CONVICTION THAT
THE MULTILATERAL FRAME WORK IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS
OF FORMING A NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY. I WILL ALSO
SUGGEST TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE UNDERTAKE A TECHNICAL
STUDY OF THE QUESTION OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE THROUGH
THE US- SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.
-- AS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFRES, THE RAPID
GROWTH IN SALES OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS IS A
SOURCE OF REAL CONCERN TO US. WE BELIEVE AN EFFORT
MUST BE MADE TO CONTROL ARMS TRANSFERS, SO AS TO
ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY AND MODERATE DANGEROUS
AND WASTEFUL COMPETITION.
-- AS THE LARGEST SUPPLIER OF ARMS, THE US RECOGNIZES
ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS ISSUE.
AT THE SAME TIMEN THERE IS A LIMIT TO WHAT WE CAN
ACCOMPLISH BY UNILATERAL STEPS. FOR THIS REASON,
I INTEND TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH THE SOVIET UNIO,,
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WHICH IS THE SECOND LARGEST ARMS SUPPLIERM
-- WHOULD THERE BE SOME INDICATION THAT THE SOVIET
UNION IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ARMS TRANSFER QUESTIONS
SERIOUSLY, WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONSULT CLOSELY WITH
YOU. OBVIOUSLY, THE QUESTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS
TRANSFERS HAS IMPORTANT ICONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO, WHICH WE WILL WANT TO
CONSIDER JOINTLY.
-- DURING OUR MOSCOE TRIP, I ALSO INTEND TO RAISE THE
SUBJECT OFMYILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN.
PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MEMTIONED OUR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE
OF SEEKING AN INDIAN OCEAN FREE OF MILITARY COMPETI-
589,. AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD THAT GOAL, I INTEND TO
QUERY THE SOVIET ON THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD MUTUAL

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MILITARY LIMITATIONS IN THE INDIAN OVEAN. IF THERE
APPEARS TO BE A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR DISCUSSION,
WE MAY WANT TO PURSUE THE QUESTION IN A PRELIMINARY WAY
WITH THE SOVIET UNIO,. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONSULT
WITH CONCERNED ALLIES ON THIS MATTER.

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EXDIS

--IN ADDITION TO THE SUBJECTS I HAVE SPOKEN OF,
WE WILL WANT TO TAKE UP, ON AN EXPLORATORY BASIS,
SEVERAL QUESTIONS -- LIMITATIONS ON ANTI-SATELLITE
CAPABILITIES, PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF MISSILE FLIGHT
TESTS, AND THE QUESTION OF LIMITING CIVIL DEFENSE
PROGRAMS.
--OUR INTEREST IN PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF MISSILE
FLIGHT TESTS IS A CONTINUATION OF OUR EFFORTS, UNDER
YPE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF
OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, TO MINIMIZE POSSIBLE MISUNDER-
STANDINGS. WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ON SOVIET
RECEPTIVITY TO INITIATIVES IN THE FOREGOING AREAS.
-- WE WILL DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS MY TRIP TO THE
MIDDLE EAST. I WILL EXPLAIN THT THEE APPEARS TO BE
A CONSENUS AMONG THE PARTIES THAT WE SHOULD WORK
TOWARD CONVENING A GENEVA CONFERENCE IN THE SECOND HALF
OF THIS YEAR. THERE ALSO APPEARS TO BE AGREEMENT THAT
THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES TO BE NEGOTIATED ARE THE
NATURE OF PEACE, THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDARY LINES, AND
SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESINIAN PROBLEM. THE QUESTION
OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE NEGOTIATING
PROCESS IS BEING ADDRESSED, PRIMARILY BY THE ARABS.
WE WILL CONVEY OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE E/:KNGNG
VIEWS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, REITERATE

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OUR OWN STRONG HOPE THAT THE GENEVA TALKS BE RECONVENED,
AND URGE THE SOVIETS TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE VIEW OF
OUR EFFORTS AND THOSE OF PARTIES IN THE AREA. WE WILL
NOT SEEK TO ENGAGE MORE ACTIVE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN
THE PROCESS AT THIS TIME.
AA ON THE SUBJECT OF AFRICA, WE WILL RESTATE OUR SUPPORT
FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN
PROBLEMS. WE WILL EXPRESS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE
VOLATILITY OF THE SITUATION ON THE HORN OF AFRICA. AND
WE WILL URGE THE SOVIETS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINT IN THAT
CONTINENT, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE FLOW OF ARMS
TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES.
--WITH REGARD TO BERLIN, WE INTEND TO REEMPHASIZE OUR
SUPPORT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND MAKE PLAIN THAT
ANY ACTION ON THE PART OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
THAT IS INTENDED TO ALTER FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND
REPSONSIBILITIES IN BERLIN IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.
--AS TO CYPRRUS, WE WILL REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT FOR THE
INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS.
--WE ALSO ANTICIPATE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL WANT
TO DISCUSS THE BELGRADE CSCE MEETING WITH US.
OUR RESPONSE WILL NOT GO INTO DETAIL AND WILL BE
CAREFULLY BASED ON POSITIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED
AMONG THE ALLIES THUS FAR.
--THESE MATTERS, PLUS BILATERAL MARITIME, CIVIL
AIR, AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, WILL CONSTITUTE THE
AGENDA OF MY MOSCOW TRIP. AS YOU CAN SEE, ITS SCOPE
IS WIDE RANGING. MY PRIMARY PURPOSE IS TO DEAL WITH
THE MAJOR STRATEGIC ISSUES FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR OVERALL
INTEREST IN PEACE AND SECURITY. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE
I WILL ALSO EXPLORE THE OTER QUESTIONS WHICH I
HAVE SET BEFORE YOU, BUT WE MAY FIND THT THIS WILL ONLY
BE DONE IN PRELIMINARY FASHION. WE WISH TO DEMONSTRATE
OUR READINESS TO OPEN UP THE DIALOGUE, TO CLARIFY
POSITIONS AND PREPARE THE WAY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.
--WE WILL SHARE THE EXPERIENCE WITH YOU. IN A FEW

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DAYS, ARTHUR HARMAN AND LESLIE GELB WILL RETURN TO
BRIEF YOU ON THE TRIP'S RESULTS. END TEXT
VANCE

SECRET

Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, SECTO, SPEECHES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 31-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977SECTO03069
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770110-0992
Format: TEL
From: SECRETARY AIRCRAFT
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t1977032/aaaaabmu.tel
Line Count: 545
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 421cd0b1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 10
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2989808
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: TEXT OF SECRETARY\'S STATEMENT TO THE NAC
TAGS: OVIP, SOPN, NAC, (VANCE, CYRUS R)
To: NATO BRUSSELS
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/421cd0b1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
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